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 Executive summary
By Seth Anziska and 
Tareq Baconi
The consequences of conflict 
management in Israel/Palestine1
The recent return to violence across Israel, the West Bank and Gaza is harrowing, but sadly predictable. It 
comes on the heels of two events that underscore the desperate nature of the political landscape between 
Israel and the Palestinians, which is devoid of any prospects for a negotiated settlement. The devastation 
wrought by the attacks on Gaza over the summer of 2014, the first of these events, is still visible 
throughout the Strip. It evokes both the destructive consequences of Israel’s military campaign and the 
crippling blockade that persists in its wake. The second event – the 2015 re-election of Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu – formalised a consensus in Israel against any diplomatic initiative to decide on the 
fate of the Palestinians. 
Against the backdrop to the current unrest, this report assesses the implications of these earlier events 
through six weeks of fieldwork in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Utilising interviews with a 
cross-section of Palestinian and Israeli politicians, cultural figures, leaders of civil society, journalists, and 
academics, this study offers a broad diagnostic of the unfolding situation. These discussions underscored 
how cyclical violence in Israel and the occupied territories is symptomatic of entrenched conflict 
management, a strategy that has led to a coarsening of Israeli politics and the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian populace. A rights-based approach to the Palestinian struggle may offer one way to overcome 
this stasis, as could other policies that impose a financial and moral cost on the occupation. 
Introduction: the chimera of bilateral 
negotiations 
Following the remarkable success of U.S. Secretary of 
State John Kerry’s P5+1 Iran initiative, the long-sought but 
elusive goal of achieving a negotiated settlement between 
Israel and the Palestinians may very well reappear in the 
final brief window of the Obama administration. Yet there is 
now widespread conviction that a return to bilateral 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians would not 
be effective. Talks between the parties will not reverse the 
rapid drift towards permanent Israeli hegemony over the 
“Greater Land of Israel” or the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian national movement. Rather, bilateral negotia-
tions would likely reinforce the asymmetrical nature of 
Israeli-Palestinian relations at the expense of substantive 
measures that could, with time, halt or even reverse this 
dangerous drift. 
The current Israeli government evinces no desire to 
relinquish control over any part of the occupied Palestinian 
territories (OPT) that could be the basis for the formation 
of a viable Palestinian state. The Palestinian leadership is 
too divided and disempowered to successfully force a shift 
in Israel’s approach towards the territories or to secure 
effective international backing for their self-determination. 
International efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement are 
in fact disincentivising the parties from taking the requisite 
action for political change, e.g. undermining the prospects 
of a Palestinian unity government by backing Mahmoud 
Abbas unconditionally and marginalising Hamas, on the 
one hand, or publicly condemning settlement expansion 
without taking corresponding action that might impose real 
consequences, on the other.
1 This report was co-commissioned by the U.S./Middle East Project (www.usmep.us) and NOREF.
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Together with the possibility of restarting bilateral negotia-
tions, there has also been a renewed focus on a potential 
UN Security Council resolution to enshrine the parameters 
of a permanent settlement to the conflict, most recently 
spearheaded by the French government (Reed, 2015b). In 
discussing this prospect with Israeli and Palestinian 
diplomats and analysts we were faced with a range of 
reactions. Several Israelis suggested that the potential for 
terms of reference could serve to force the hand of Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the wider Israeli political 
establishment. Despite an Israeli track record of ignoring 
external pressure, these interviewees argued that in the 
case of a resolution with wide backing, Israeli officials 
would have to respond to UN action with substantive 
movement towards a negotiated settlement or face greater 
international opprobrium. 
For many Palestinians, a UN gesture was seen as an 
unlikely but possibly welcome initiative that could recali-
brate the uneven nature of their struggle. Others, however, 
felt that continuing to push forward an initiative rooted in a 
two-state model failed to contend with the collapse of such 
an option in the wake of the second intifada. In his address 
to the UN, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas alluded 
to his decision to revisit the commitment of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) to the Oslo Accords, given Israel’s failure to 
fulfil its own obligations (Beaumont, 2015b). There was 
also a great deal of cynicism about whether such an 
initiative could work, given the dismal track record of grand 
gestures at the international level. The need to reaffirm 
well-known policies, like a statement regarding the 
illegality of settlements, was deemed by some to be 
redundant. Many voiced more acute fears that a UN 
resolution would simply “kick the can down the road” for 
the next U.S. or European leader. It is unclear whether or 
not such initiatives to enshrine diplomatic parameters in 
international forums could be effective. But with the 
ever-widening gap between events on the ground and 
visions of a comprehensive settlement, focusing on local 
developments remains imperative.
Palestinians in the wake of the attacks on 
Gaza: fragmentation and resilience
The division of Palestinian society can perhaps be best 
understood as one moves from the beaches of Jaffa in Israel 
to the back alleys of Wadi al-Joz in East Jerusalem, and 
through the Qalandia and Erez checkpoints to the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. In each of these distinct realities (not to 
mention far-flung diaspora communities), diverging contexts 
have produced stark differences in Palestinian life. With 
each community confronting a particular set of challenges, 
there is great concern that the overarching narrative of the 
struggle for Palestinian self-determination has given way to 
disparate, localised and easily managed initiatives. 
Communities like the unrecognised villages of the Negev 
or the liminal space of East Jerusalem are feeling the 
weight of this political fragmentation in the absence of 
leaders or institutions that can better integrate them into 
the Palestinian fold. This lack of guidance has no doubt 
exacerbated the sense of desperation that underpins lone 
acts of violence, particularly in the case of East Jerusalem, 
referred to in one interview as the “weakest Palestinian 
entity”. The erosion of an effective political instrument to 
guide and unify these various communities into a cohesive 
and representative whole should be the highest priority for 
Palestinian leaders today.
West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem
Observers of the tensions that erupted in Jerusalem over 
al-Haram al-Sharif/the Temple Mount are often quick to 
read the violence as religiously motivated. To be sure, 
religion animates Jewish, Muslim, and Christian feelings 
about Jerusalem and the Holy Land more broadly. Reli-
gious symbols have historically served as a prime motiva-
tor of national sentiment, underpinning both violent attacks 
and political decision-making. Understanding the legitimis-
ing force of religion is crucial in addressing this conflict. 
However, reducing the violence in Jerusalem to religious 
sentiment alone overlooks the broader national and 
political crises that inhere throughout the OPT. It is 
therefore imperative to understand the structural issues 
confronting the Palestinians. 
In Ramallah there is hope among the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) leadership that initiatives to interna-
tionalise their political struggle by pursuing legal avenues 
in the International Criminal Court (ICC) and targeted 
boycotts might “challenge Israeli impunity and remind the 
international community of their responsibility”. The 
overdue adoption by the PLO of such initiatives builds on 
widespread popular support for the Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, legal accountability, and 
international recognition of statehood. But as one PLO 
adviser wondered out loud, “is it perhaps too little too 
late?” The value of symbolic politics, like the UN or 
Sweden’s recognition of a Palestinian state, is only effective 
when accompanied by strategies to create real change on 
the ground. While the ICC initiative and BDS tactics can 
have an impact on their own, they hardly constitute a 
strategy for national liberation.  
One of the main reasons is the dormancy of the PLO, the 
sole recognised representative of the Palestinian people. 
Over the years the PLO has been subsumed by the office of 
the president of the PA, the interim government estab-
lished by the Oslo Accords. The PA was intended as a 
temporary arrangement to administer the OPT on the road 
to statehood. Despite the seeming permanence of the PA, 
the institution of the PLO continues to be regarded as the 
backbone of the struggle for liberation. “Given all the 
problems of the PLO”, one Palestinian adviser asserted, 
“the institution and its mandate are still supported, even if 
its leadership is not.” 
Mahmoud Abbas’s consistent attempts to revive the PLO – 
including his latest resignation from its Executive Commit-
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tee – fail to address the absence of representative leader-
ship (Buttu, 2015). Efforts are reportedly under way to carry 
out reform initiatives under Egyptian auspices, which is an 
indication that Abbas is intent on PLO reform as part of his 
legacy. Despite this nod to reform, interviews with PA 
leaders in the West Bank revealed a centralisation of 
decision-making around President Abbas that has exclud-
ed the rest of the leadership, leaving major decisions about 
the Palestinians’ future contingent on the whims of a single 
individual. Institutionally, there is a lack of investment in a 
younger generation of Palestinians and a dangerous 
opacity with regard to succession plans.
Perhaps as a consequence of Oslo, and particularly under 
Abbas’s tenure, pressing everyday concerns related to 
governance and autonomous self-rule have eclipsed the 
wider national struggle. This has bred a condition of what 
Israeli scholar Eyal Weizman has called “prosthetic 
sovereignty”, whereby the Palestinian leadership clings to 
vestiges of control that have little substance in the face of 
the ongoing occupation (Weizman, 2007: 155-57).
A major obstacle undermining the prospect for real reform 
is the entrenched division between Hamas in Gaza and the 
Fatah-dominated PA in the West Bank. Repeated calls for 
reconciliation belie any intent by either party to pursue 
lasting unity, and in fact obscure the international policies 
that initiated and continue to sustain this division. Discus-
sions with members of Fatah and Hamas in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip underscored a tactical short-term approach 
to unity talks. Many in the Ramallah-based leadership 
questioned Hamas’s commitment to the national struggle, 
e.g. by citing its loyalty to the international movement of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Among Hamas’s leaders there 
was uniform scepticism that any reconciliation was 
possible and a cynical acceptance of the need to maintain 
the charade of unity talks for the purposes of local legiti-
macy. Neither party exhibits a readiness to make the 
concessions necessary for lasting reconciliation. 
For this dynamic to change the international community 
must revisit policies that enshrine the division by ostracis-
ing Hamas. Further, to move towards reconciliation, 
support must be extended to the PA to assume responsibil-
ity for administering the Gaza Strip. This includes the 
ability to address such intractable issues as the merging of 
government bureaucracies and attendant disagreements 
like the payment of civil sector wages. Ultimately, recon-
ciliation efforts must contend with the reality that Hamas is 
unlikely to disarm or become subservient to the PA’s 
security forces in Gaza in the absence of wider progress on 
the national front. 
In the Gaza Strip it is clear that the Israeli blockade and 
intermittent assaults have failed to fundamentally weaken 
Hamas’s hold on power. The movement appears to be quite 
rooted in its role as a ruling authority. Its focus on local 
governance, intermittent use of violence and creeping 
authoritarianism have all come to mark Hamas’s full 
control of the Strip. Despite severe financial constraints, 
tumultuous regional relations, and sporadic internal 
dissent from Gaza’s population and from more extreme 
fringe groups, Hamas is unlikely to relinquish any authority 
to its rivals. The cyclical escalations with Israel, most 
recently the war in the summer of 2014, and the continuing 
blockade only serve to bolster Hamas’s legitimacy. They 
allow the movement to continue to promote a vision of 
national liberation independently of the PLO, from which it 
has been effectively marginalised. This has resulted in the 
creation of two competing Palestinian leadership struc-
tures that indirectly serve the interests of Israel. 
Palestinians in Israel
Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of the 2015 Israeli 
election was the success of the Joint List, a political 
alliance comprising Hadash, the United Arab List, Balad 
and Ta’al. Bringing together rival secularists and Islamists, 
as well as Jewish party members, the number of Knesset 
seats the Joint List secured exceeded expectations. As a 
result of tireless community organising, thousands of 
first-time student voters were transported back from the 
West Bank, where many were undertaking their university 
studies, to vote at their homes in Israel. While there is no 
illusion that the Joint List brings unity across the Arab-
Jewish divide, or even a singular vision of Palestinian 
politics within the 1948 borders, it remains a promising 
vehicle for political change.2
Structurally detached for too long from the wider Palestin-
ian political sphere, Palestinians in Israel are today 
contending with the erasure of their cultural identity and 
persistent institutionalised discrimination that weakens the 
nature of their citizenship (National Committee for the 
Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006; 
Jabareen, 2007; Natour, 2012). With the tacit approval of 
the PLO and Hamas, Palestinians in Israel have reasserted 
political power. Speaking with civil society leaders in Haifa, 
Nazareth and Jaffa, a case was made that the Arab 
community in Israel is poised to forge alliances with other 
marginalised minorities, such as the Russian community, 
Mizrahim and Ethiopians.3 Such an emerging constellation 
may serve as a platform to negotiate a new civil agenda, 
fight discrimination and challenge the dominance of 
centre-right politics in Israel. However, this case may be 
overstated. Discussions with Israelis affirmed that many 
disenfranchised minority constituencies continue to view 
themselves as part of the right-wing consensus and would 
never consider a strategic alignment with Arab citizens.
This focus on the immediate struggles of Palestinians in 
Israel has not gone unnoticed by PLO leaders in the West 
Bank. With increased coordination and “cross-border” 
2 Note the recent tension among Arab politicians in Israel (Eldar, 2015; Lubell, 2015).
3 One activist close to the Joint List spoke of tactical alliances with far-right politicians such as Miri Regev, MK, on funding for cultural institutions that could divert 
funds from more privileged Ashkenazi elites. 
4  NOREF Report – January 2016
projects that tackle issues such as economic cooperation 
and a shared cultural agenda, the success of Palestinians 
in Israel is, in the view of the authors, poised to invigorate 
politics across divides.4 As one Ramallah-based analyst 
commented, “the sheer fact that discussions are happen-
ing between 1948 [Palestinians in Israel] and 1967 [Pales-
tinians in the OPT] is in itself incredible”. Given differences 
in their respective priorities, most of the PLO leaders 
interviewed adamantly distinguished between their 
initiatives and the struggle of Palestinians in Israel, while 
still praising the latter’s achievements. One leader of 
Palestinian civil society in Israel proclaimed, “while each 
side does not intervene in the internal politics of the other, 
both sides are now speaking as one people”. Another PLO 
official remarked that “our hearts are with the Joint List. 
They are our people. They are not strangers.”
Among the most intriguing avenues of political activism 
that are being spearheaded by Palestinians in Israel is the 
rights-based approach to achieving full equality with their 
Jewish counterparts. In his speeches and interviews since 
the election, member of Knesset (MK) and leader of the 
Joint List Ayman Odeh, as well as colleagues such as Aida 
Touma-Sliman, MK, have positioned Palestinian civil rights 
at the heart of the Joint List’s struggle (Miller, 2015). In 
distinct and relatable terms, often in Hebrew, these leaders 
have also appealed to the Jewish public, opening the 
possibility of a joint civic space that can move away from 
the stranglehold of ethnic identity towards more inclusive 
politics. While this may be particular to Palestinians in 
Israel, and may conveniently sideline the reality of the 
occupation, it still touches on a debate that is currently 
unfolding among Palestinian civil society globally. Can a 
rights-based struggle better advance the historical pursuit 
of collective self-determination? 
Israel in the age of Netanyahu: choosing 
Jewishness over democracy 
The results of the March 2015 Israeli elections underscored 
the solidification of Israeli expansionism across the Green 
Line with the continuing appeal of the “Greater Land of 
Israel” ideology among large swathes of the voting public. 
Negotiations over the formation of a coalition government 
highlighted the persistence of Likud’s grip on the political 
establishment and the subservience of the so-called Left to 
a Netanyahu-led government (Mendel, 2015). 
Rather than focus on the eclipse of the Palestinian ques-
tion from public and political discourse – a valuable 
contribution of any opposition to the Likud party – self-
proclaimed centre and centre-left politicians instead 
pandered to the traditional right-wing view. One popular 
MK from the Zionist Union, on being asked about the 
absence of the Palestinian issue in the campaign, argued 
that it was actually at the heart of the election. “Had the 
election focused on the economy, Bibi [Benjamin Netan-
yahu] wouldn’t have won. This election was about security, 
like every other election in Israel.” The MK’s insistence on 
the centrality of the Palestinian issue – and the inadvertent 
reduction of the Palestinian’s future to a security paradigm 
– demonstrates quite clearly how the opposition has been 
subsumed by a right-wing worldview.
The perception of weakness and a reluctance to appear 
unpatriotic have driven the opposition to focus on domestic 
issues, leaving the Palestinian portfolio squarely under the 
remit of the ruling coalition. Opposition politicians like 
Isaac “Bougie” Herzog, MK, the leader of the Zionist Union, 
and Yair Lapid, MK, the chairman of the Yesh Atid party, 
have in fact outflanked Netanyahu in their criticism of 
European efforts at settlement differentiation and on the 
blockade policy in Gaza (Levy, 2015). Any possibility of 
domestic realignment appears to lie with the revitalised 
politics of Israel’s minorities, including Russians, Ethiopi-
ans, and Mizrahim, who have long felt patronised and 
condescended to by the dominant Likud and Labour 
establishments. As some are now arguing, their shared 
discontent could finally provide an opening that has long 
eluded minority politics in Israel. It remains unclear, 
however, whether or not these parties will ever sit along-
side the Joint List in a unified opposition.
Netanyahu’s triumph and the collapse of any viable 
challenger have therefore codified a conflict management 
approach rather than the pursuit of a lasting diplomatic 
solution. Invoking possible annexation in Area C of the West 
Bank, as the leader of the Jewish Home Party, Naftali 
Bennett, has outlined, as well as continuing settlement 
expansion and conducting regular military operations in 
Gaza are the natural manifestations of this approach, and 
have done little to unsettle the Israeli public (Jewish Daily 
Forward, 2014; Jerusalem Post, 2015).
The outgrowth of this paradigm is seen most destructively 
in the repeated cycle of Israeli incursions into Gaza, 
chillingly referred to as “mowing the lawn” (Rabbani, 2014). 
As several interviews revealed, such an approach is 
justified by Israel’s selective invocation of its tumultuous 
regional surroundings as the latest in a series of historical 
excuses for inaction. With the war in Syria spilling over 
Israel’s northern border, unrest in the Sinai increasing 
tensions in the south, and acute concern over the Islamic 
State, realist members of the Israeli security establish-
ment suggested that Netanyahu feeds on this climate to 
maintain steadfast opposition to the emergence of Pales-
tinian sovereignty in the OPT. 
The unwillingness to pay the price required to achieve 
Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
East Jerusalem – accelerated by the second intifada, but 
rooted in Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol’s “decision not 
to decide” on the fate of the territories in the aftermath of 
the 1967 war (Raz, 2012: 44) – has been accompanied by a 
4 One Palestinian scholar suggested that with the gains of the Joint List, Palestinian nationalism is entering a new phase in its history. 
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coarsening of Israeli political culture. As one adviser to the 
security establishment cautioned, many Israelis will readily 
choose the Jewish character of their state over democracy. 
Faced with the threat of possible economic sanctions or 
boycotts, voters will persist in their commitment to a 
Jewish state, even an occupying one, over liberalism and 
full equality. While this calculus may eventually shift, there 
has been a marked increase in incidents of racism and 
religious intolerance towards non-Jewish citizens and price 
tag attacks on Palestinians living under occupation. The 
burning of Ali Dawabsheh and his parents in a firebomb 
attack on their Duma home by Israeli extremists was only 
the latest in a string of violent attacks that reflect a 
dangerous trend on the far right (Hirschhorn, 2015).
With the exception of rocket fire from Gaza falling on major 
cities like Tel Aviv (as was seen in the summer of 2014) and 
the recent wave of stabbing attacks throughout Israel and 
the West Bank, the daily reality of life under occupation has 
been entirely out of sight and out of mind for most Israelis. 
Busloads of diaspora Jews on carefully curated “Birth-
right” trips typically see little to pierce this false sense of 
normalcy, a pernicious phenomenon that small but 
influential groups such as the Israel-based Breaking the 
Silence and the U.S.-based Encounter have attempted to 
reverse. The dogged persistence of such groups and the 
work of Israeli NGOs like Gisha and B’tselem have pains-
takingly documented the reality that underpins this 
collective detachment or denial. Certainly, the crucial 
constituency of West Bank settlers who regularly drive by 
Palestinian towns and villages and traverse checkpoints on 
their way into Israel, or who live under military protection 
in occupied cities like Hebron, must bear witness to the 
consequences of their privilege. Yet this does little to 
challenge the sense of entitlement that strengthens their 
often-messianic hold on the OPT. 
Rapidly spreading acts of violence perpetrated by individual 
Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank have temporarily 
burst the illusion of normalcy that underpins this status 
quo (Thrall, 2015). Apart from fleeting recognition that the 
situation is untenable, however, crippling violence has in 
the past generally failed to engender substantive change 
except for a redoubled effort on the security front.  For 
many progressive liberals in Israel with whom we spoke, 
such a recurring state of affairs elicits anguish, exaspera-
tion and in numerous instances a genuine desire to leave.5 
This has also bred a more critical diaspora politics, 
particularly among younger Jewish supporters of Israel 
(Beinart, 2015; Grover, 2015; Sherwood, 2015). But the lack 
of sustained costs of the persistent occupation for Israel’s 
public, as several private sector leaders affirmed, could 
only be broken by policies that would disturb the prevailing 
sense of normalcy. The impact of BDS on the domestic 
front has so far been marginal, as can be seen by Israel’s 
booming economy. The EU’s successful push to differenti-
ate between settlement products and goods manufactured 
in Israel proper, in contrast, offers a symbolically powerful 
jolt (Felderman & Casert, 2015; Lovatt & Toaldo, 2015).
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in enacting this 
policy, concerned Israelis singled out such EU guidelines 
as a potentially effective tool to shake off collective apathy. 
As reactions to the FIFA initiative and the Orange telecom 
exchange in the summer of 2015 attested, the Israeli public 
seems most vulnerable when targeted initiatives bring 
pressure to bear on everyday life (Reed, 2015a). These 
pinpointed actions could potentially be more destabilising 
than blanket BDS policies. The latter mostly affect isolated 
sectors like the academy and the arts, while the former 
could affect the wider populace. Local business personali-
ties who are sympathetic to the goal of achieving a negoti-
ated two-state settlement spoke of the need for well- 
designed measures that could force private sector busi-
nesses to be at the forefront of pushing for a shift in policy. 
Such measures could also be amplified across Israeli 
society with the re-evaluation of selective privileges, like 
the need for visas to enter European countries.
 With the exception of these isolated voices, the BDS 
campaign has been met with collective condemnation or 
indifference. The spectre of boycotts and sanctions intensi-
fies a siege mentality among Israelis that politicians deftly 
play up. Netanyahu’s assertion that Israel must fight BDS 
in the same way that it fights Iran demonstrates the use of 
fear-mongering as a means to avoid substantive change 
(Beaumont, 2015a). U.S. debates and legislative actions 
against BDS only bolster this reactive stance among 
Israel’s politicians. As a result, there is little impetus for 
Israel to depart from a paradigm of simply managing the 
Palestinian issue.
If any pressure were to increase on Israel, it has been 
suggested that Netanyahu will simply invoke regional 
horrors and provide minimal cosmetic change packaged as 
beneficent concessions.6 They will hardly meet the lowest 
ceiling of required diplomatic action. As Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon’s bureau chief, Dov Weisglass, once quipped 
in the context of the Gaza disengagement, Israel’s goal is 
“actually Formaldehyde. It supplies the amount of formal-
dehyde that’s necessary so that there will not be a political 
process with the Palestinians” (Shavit, 2004). This remains 
the favoured stance of Israeli politicians today. 
A Palestinian pivot?  
How might Palestinians themselves break free of this 
stranglehold? One possible alternative that is expressed 
with growing conviction is the emergence of a Palestinian 
civil rights movement, both in the Palestinian community in 
Israel and the OPT, as well as in the Palestinian diaspora. 
Many interviewees extolled the virtues of this rights-based 
5 Polls indicate growing dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s foreign policy among the Israeli public, but the Palestinian issue remains low on the list of primary con-
cerns; see MITIVIM (2015). 
6 Conversely, PA officials were quick to use the threat of the Islamic State – which is no doubt a source of real anxiety – to call for a rapid resolution of the conflict.
6  NOREF Report – January 2016
approach, which broadly entails the pursuit of equal 
citizenship under a single sovereign and fully representa-
tive entity. This would mean a retreat from an ethnocentric 
form of Israeli governance and a move towards a “one 
person, one vote” model of statehood (e.g. see Munayyer, 
2015). While critics of such a pivot loudly denounce the 
implications of this move for maintaining the Jewish 
character of Israel, proponents of a rights-based approach 
must also consider the pitfalls. Palestinian thinkers 
warned that such a pivot entails a risk of inadvertently 
steering the struggle towards individual rights at the 
expense of the broader collective. This would mark the end 
of the Palestinian national struggle and a departure from 
decades of seeking sovereign statehood. 
PLO leaders therefore questioned the value of turning away 
from the symbols of national self-determination that had 
traditionally been at the heart of Palestinian politics 
towards the more undefined notion of rights. How the two 
can go hand in hand in securing a better Palestinian future 
– rather than being seen in competing terms – remains a 
matter of contestation. As one interviewee suggested, “One 
can maintain the demands for rights without eliding the 
political strategy in terms of UN resolutions or the bids for 
statehood …. Mobilising around Palestinian rights is easy, 
but how do we link that with a political agenda?” This 
debate is ongoing, and is happening both within and 
outside traditional PLO institutions (Bashir & Dakwar, 
2014). 
An intentional pivot towards a rights-based approach would 
undoubtedly serve as a form of non-violent intervention in 
the current political landscape. Ironically, many speak of 
the pivot towards rights as the prerequisite to mobilising 
the international community in support of a two-state 
outcome. In this line of thinking, the prospect of a reinvig-
orated Palestinian community demanding equality across 
historic Palestine and in the diaspora would compel the 
Israeli government to end the occupation for fear that the 
emerging demographic reality would undermine the 
Jewish character of the Israeli state. Notwithstanding the 
ethnocentric hue of this logic, it nonetheless speaks to 
those who remain loyal to the two-state model in both the 
Israeli and Palestinian communities. For these proponents, 
the end goal of any diplomatic solution ultimately must 
lead to territorial divorce. 
In contrast, for advocates of the rights-based approach, 
this (re-)emerging discourse forces a reckoning with the 
prospect of national cohabitation in the territory between 
the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. Given the unequal 
one-state reality that currently exists in this territorial unit, 
such a prospect is producing thoughtful and innovative 
suggestions for the creation of new models for inclusive 
and representative governance. These models would have 
to address issues pertaining to collective self-determina-
tion, as well as the right of return for Palestinian refugees. 
Against the current backdrop, such a pivot would be a 
bracing development. For it to be effective, however, it 
would require thoughtful preparation and a sustained effort 
on the part of civil society leaders to coordinate across 
their respective communities and combine the Palestinian 
national struggle with what would effectively become a civil 
rights movement.   
How would the international community react to such a 
rights-based struggle? World leaders in the EU and U.S., 
as well as emerging powers, would certainly be hard-
pressed to dismiss genuine calls for equality. At a time 
when both the U.S. and EU in particular are focused on the 
question of rights in their own domestic contexts, it will be 
difficult to justify inherently discriminatory polices if the 
Palestinian struggle is framed in this way. 
Conclusion
Events in Israel and the OPT may swiftly overtake this more 
deliberate reconfiguration of the Palestinian struggle. The 
current unravelling is an unsurprising outgrowth of a 
dynamic that has failed to address the systematic elision of 
Palestinian rights, both individual and collective. This could 
very well indicate a tipping point that both grows out of an 
unsustainable reality and irrevocably transforms that 
reality itself (Lustick, 2013). In such a despair-inducing 
environment religion becomes a powerful tool for fuelling 
further confrontation, as can be seen in Jerusalem, around 
Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus and in the city of Hebron. 
For Palestinians, whose leadership is now indicating a shift 
in strategy whereby the Oslo model may be annulled, the 
descent into violence presents a formidable challenge. In 
the absence of a unified, representative and authoritative 
body, how do Palestinians effectively manage this recali-
bration? For Israelis, who have only ever seriously consid-
ered the fate of the Palestinians when faced with the costs 
of Israel’s perpetual inaction, what is the threshold at 
which they will ultimately consider relinquishing control of 
an entire population and turning away from an exclusionary 
model of governance? For the international community, 
which has consistently decried the collective failure to 
resolve this conflict, when will individual government 
policies impose a degree of accountability that is a prere-
quisite for any substantive change on the ground (Dajani & 
Husseini, 2014)?  
It is often easy to forget the context that underpins rapid 
disintegration, but we ignore these wider trends at our 
peril. This report has attempted to move beyond short-
term reactions to unfolding events in favour of a longer-
term view. History has been an infallible guide in this 
regard: without addressing the core grievances that 
animate this conflict, any settlement will surely prove 
elusive.
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